PARTY SPIRIT

In TIME of

PUBLICK DANGER,

CONSIDERED.

WHEREIN,

The Effects of the NATIONAL DEBT; the Neceſſity of our CONNECTIONS on the CONTINENT; with the Nature of our Preſent SUBSIDY FORCES, and the Antient MERCENARIES;

Are fully DISCUSSED.

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BRITISH MUSEUM

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CONSIDERED.

WHOEVER has attentively conſidered the Turn which Affairs have lately taken, with the Cauſes which have long been operating to produce it, will ſee very clearly, that our Fate as a Nation, muſt in a great Meaſure, depend upon the Uſe we make of the preſent Conjuncture.

Great Britain and *France* are the firſt Movers, by whoſe Conduct and Fortune thoſe of all the other States in *Europe* are now conſtantly determined. The great Object of the Policy of *Britain*, is to preſerve her own Freedom and Importance, by preſerving the Independency and the Balance of all the others; the Drift of the *French* Poli-

ticks is to overturn this Balance, by diminiſhing that Power, whoſe Weight alone can preſerve it. Great Difficulties always attended the Deſigns of *France* when they were purſued in *Europe*; the Alarm was eaſily taken; all Advances were ſlow, and dearly bought; and after a long War, and the Waſte of infinite Blood and Treaſure, a Peace left their Landmarks juſt where they were before; one Treaty, for ſome few Family Honours, but no ſolid national Advantage, deſtroyed the Effect of ſo many proſperous Sieges and ſucceſsful Battles. They had felt a Wound too in a Part, which ſhewed them more clearly than ever that their firſt Plan was ill laid.

Foiled therefore in their direct Deſigns upon the Liberties of *Europe*, they took a Compaſs, to come with the more Certainty, becauſe leſs Suſpicion at their purpoſed Point. The Way they took was by encreaſing their own Strength, and leſſening ours upon the Continent of *North America*. The Wealth *France* had already drawn from the *Weſt-Indies*, and her conſiderable Eſtabliſhments there, made her feel the Neceſſity of a Force upon the Connent, for turning thoſe Eſtabliſhments to the beſt Account, and for drawing new and greater Advantages from a Country, whoſe Situation deſtined it the Seat of the moſt extenſive and beneficial Commerce. It was obvious, that a mighty Augmentation of naval Strength, muſt be the certain Conſequence a of Superiority in *America*; and a naval Strength muſt

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be every Thing to *France* in her Scheme of Aggrandiſement in *Europe*. What added to the Advantage of extending herſelf upon that Side, was the Eaſe with which it might be accompliſhed. *England* had been ſupine enough with Regard to the Colonies; they grew to what they are, more from their own excellent Situation, and the Influence of the *Engliſh* Liberty and Laws, which they carried into the Deſarts, than by any extraordinary Encouragement from Home; and as for the other Powers of *Europe*, they expected but little Oppoſition from them; as the Object was very remote, and none of them had any immediate Concern in it; add to this, that the groſſeſt Ignorance of *American* Affairs prevailed almoſt univerſally. In many of theſe Points, *France* was undoubtedly not at all miſtaken; ſhe made an inſenſible, but not an inconſiderable Progreſs; her Encroachments were very great; and ſhe ſupported them with Forts and Garriſons; gained the Natives to their Intereſts, and omitted nothing to extend and ſecure their Settlements upon every Side.

The Importance of our Colonies and their Danger appeared to us at the ſame Time; this brought on a Quarrel between us and *France*; and this Quarrel brought the Reſt of *Europe* to attend to *America* and to be intereſted in the Succeſs of the contending Parties there. *America*, is now added to the Syſtem of *Europe*. This is a real Revolution, and begins a new and a memorable Æra in Po-

liticks. It is not long ſince this Part of the World has been much attended to, and much of the preſent Trouble aroſe from this Inattention. In Treaties, the Regulation of Rights there was generally poſtponed; it was looked upon as little more than a Station for the Fur Trade, and *France* would have it ſtill conſidered in no other Light; but the Extent and Firmneſs of the Roots ſhe has caſt there, ſhews ſhe likes the Soil; this Quarrel is really ſomething more than *about the making a few Hats.* Indeed this Part of the World is ſuch a Fund of Commerce, ſupplies ſo many new Articles, and ſo connects and binds together the detached Parts of its Syſtem, abounds with ſuch an Exuberance of all Sorts of Proviſions, and is ſuch a natural Magazine of all Sorts of naval Stores, that the Power of any State there muſt be, in a great Meaſure, the Standard, which will regulate the Rank it is to hold in *Europe.*

We are now at the Point of this Adjuſtment, and the Event of the impending War muſt finally determine, whether we muſt be a precarious Power, ſupported only by the contending Intereſts of the others, and ever ſubſervient to the Uppermoſt; or whether we ſhall ſit at the Head of *Europe*, with Authority to give the Law and Power to enforce it, as the general Safety, and our own Dignity may require. It is therefore no Wonder, that the Attention of every Body is turned to the Publick Tranſactions; but it is therefore of the greateſt Moment for every Body to be cautious,

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and to keep as detached as poſſible from all ſuch private or party Conſiderations, as might influence them to form Judgments contrary to the real Nature of Things, or to take Steps prejudicial to the general Intereſt. We play at preſent for a very great Stake; and every Diſturbance our Paſſion may give thoſe, who manage the Game for us, muſt be productive of our own Ruin.

It is not only the Greatneſs of the Intereſt we contend for, but the Party too with whom we contend, which makes it incumbent on every Body to think and to act with particular Moderation at this Time. On the Eve of a War with one of the moſt powerful Monarchies the World ever ſaw; with a State doubly exaſperated, by having its Views to our Prejudice diſcovered and diſconcerted, and by having itſelf received Provocations, which for ſome Time they could neither reſent with Prudence, nor paſs by with Honour. And what is yet of further Conſideration; we are on the Point of engaging with this moſt powerful and moſt exaſperated of all Enemies, on this moſt intereſting of all Cauſes, with ſome internal Diſadvantages; we are conſiderably in Debt; and this Circumſtance, which thoſe who wiſh ill to the Publick, make frequent Mention of to diſunite us, ought really, in a Time of Danger, to be the ſtrongeſt Bond of our Union.

A little before the Opening of this remarkable Scene, we loſt a Miniſter of long Experience in Affairs; they are now partly in new Hands,

Hands, and an Oppoſition is formed from a new Quarter, which has joined itſelf to the old One, and both proceeded with much Violence though hitherto, I think, with but little Succeſs. They have excepted againſt the Capacity and Integrity of the now Miniſter; they have condemned every Step he has taken in the Conduct of Affairs, and have added to their particular Objections all thoſe Complaints, which for many Years have been common in our Mouths, of the general Corruption, the Decay of publick Spirit, the national Weakneſs, and other popular Topics, which give a Currency to more refined Notions, and ſuch Arguments, as are of a Nature too remote from common Apprehenſion.

I am very far from thinking that we do not want ſome Reformation in many Things; the People is perhaps much corrupted, and the *Britiſh* Spirit lowered. Theſe are Evils, which all good Men feel very ſenſibly; and they complain of them with perhaps more Sincerity, though with Leſs Violence, than many of thoſe who have winked at this Corruption and Degeneracy, and ſometimes even contributed to them, to ſerve one Set of Ends, and now rail at them to ſerve another. There is a great and a material Difference, between thoſe, who ſpeak of our Faults or our Weakneſs to amend us, and thoſe, who only call them up, with a Deſign to confound us in our Endeavours to get clear of their ill Conſequences. I have a Nephew who, by his Vices and Extravagance,

travagance, has drawn himſelf into indigent and almoſt deſperate Circumſtances; but I have ſome Regard for his Family, which is my own; when therefore he came to me ſome Time ago, expreſſing a Senſe of his former Errors, ſhewed me that he was entering into a Courſe of Induſtry, which might redeem what he had loſt by his ill Conduct, I advanced him ſuch a Sum, as, with the Advice I gave him, might put him once again in the Way of being a Credit and Advantage to his Family. But had I, when he applied to me, ſeverely reproached his former Life, ridiculed and thwarted his Schemes for repairing his paſt Follies, and turned him out of Doors without a Penny of Money; had I done this, I had certainly done as a great Part of the World would upon the like Occaſion; but as certainly, nobody in his Senſes could ſay I was a *Friend* to this young Man, notwithſtanding the Gravity of my Sentences, or the Severity of my Reflection upon his ill Conduct. Such is alway, the Difference between the Advice of a Friend, and the Reproaches of an Enemy, in publick and private Life; in States, and in Families. For good Senſe and good Policy are the ſame Things acting only upon different Objects.

Confeſſing then, that the publick Debt is great; that publick Spirit has decayed; that the Nation is upon the Brink of Ruin, and that our Patriot Orators are ſeriouſly intent upon preſerving us from it. What Inference ſhall we draw from this? Shall we, becauſe we are perhaps

perhaps leſs able to reſent Injuries than formerly, ſuffer Injuries that muſt further diſable us? Shall we, becauſe we are a corrupted Nation, and deſerve Puniſhment, draw down that Puniſhment upon our own Heads, and inflict it with our own Hands? Or ſhall we wiſh for a Change of Miniſtry, until we wiſh for a Change of Meaſures, and until the Candidates for the Succeſſion can plead ſome better Title than their Diſcontent, and their Deſire of ſuch a Change?

Undoubtedly, before we made any Preparation for War, we ought to have been well convinced that it was extremely neceſſary; and that a Peace, though with a ſmoother and more flattering Appearance, would be finally more prejudical to the Nation. And in Fact we were convinced of this; the general Opinion was, that for many Years before the *Spaniſh* War, we had been directed by a puſilanimous Syſtem of Politicks, which was detrimental to our Credit; and ruinous to our Intereſts abroad. We ſaw, with great Uneaſineſs, the Rivalſhip of the *French* Commerce: We complained of the Injuries our own had tamely ſuffered in the *Spaniſh Weſt-Indies*; we were exaſperated at the Length and Fruitleſſneſs of the Negotiations, which was the Way then taken to redreſs them; the Light this Conduct appeared in, was, what gave a Colour to the Oppoſition which ſhook the then Miniſter, and occaſioned the *Spaniſh*, and by Degrees all the ſubſequent Wars. We have been

been accuſed of Puſilanimity in the Treaty of *Aix*, I dont enquire with what Reaſon, I think with very little, but it was blamed; and the defective Execution of it was no leſs complained of afterwards. The Timidity of our Miniſtry, and the national Diſgrace were conſtant Topics; we were alarmed by the Progreſs the *French* had made in *America*, andby the Attention they gave to the Encreaſe of their Marine. The debauching our *India* Allies, the conſtant Hoſtilities of thoſe in *Nova Scotia*, the Forts erected in that Province, aswell as in *New England* and *Virginia*, gave us the greateſt Uneaſineſs for the Preſent; but the Proſpect was worſe for Futurity; the Extention of the *French* Settlements from the Gulph of St. *Lawrence* to the Mouth of the *Miſſiſippi*; the Ruin this muſt bring on the moſt valuable Parts of our Trade; a Confinement within a narrow Tract; a vaſt Frontier to defend; future and worſe Encroachments encouraged by paſt Impunity; theſe were Things which made the Nation demand a War; the Miniſtry acted from the ſame Spirit, and the whole People, as a Man, ſeemed to think that, the only Step which could reſtore us to a reſpectable Condition.

Some Wars we have had, into which a regal or miniſterial Ambition had betrayed the People; others into which popular Fury had forced the Miniſter; we have often miſtaken our Intereſts, or purſued them by miſtaken Meaſures; but this is a War, called for by the Deſires of the Peopſe, confirmed by the Judg-

ment of the Miniſtry, warranted by our Intereſt, ſanctified by the Juſtice of the Motives, and carried on in a Manner, of all others, beſt adapted to our own Circumſtances, and the moſt effectual to oppoſe the Deſigns of the Enemy.

I do not think that any Body, at that Time, teſtified the leaſt Diſpleaſure at the Preparations which were made for a War, nor at the Manner of making them. They were indeed carried on with great Vigour, and Diſpatch; and to this Vigour, we muſt probably owe a great Part of what Advantages, we may hope from the Continuance of the War with Succeſs; or the Prevention of it, by reaſonable Conceſſions from the Court of *France*; we were not wanting to ourſelves, either in *Europe*, or in *America*; though in the latter Part, we had not all that Succeſs, which we promiſed ourſelves; for to ſay the Truth, Affairs in that Part of the World were then, as at moſt other Times, carried on without a ſufficient Knowledge of the ſeveral Circumſtances of the Country, which is a new Scene of Operation; therefore it is no Wonder that ſome Errors have been committed; but they are neither very great, nor irreparable, nor in any Sort fit to balance the Advantages, we derive from the vigorous and effective Steps we have taken. Theſe have always very remarkable Effects; they ſtrike a Dread into the Enemy, and they create a reſpectable Opinion of us in our own Minds, and in thoſe of our Allies;

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we give them a Pledge, by this reſolute Exertion of our Strength, that we are not willing to compound our Claims, or to leave them to the Iſſue of tedious and unfruitful Negotiations; beſides that, ſuch a Beginning makes the Breach between us and the Enemy ſo wide, that it can never be repaired, but upon Terms very advantageous to us, or very deſtructive; and this Circumſtance is a further Security for a vigorous Proceeding. Therefore, as we were to a man convinced of the Neceſſity of thoſe Meaſures, as we thought them to be truly *Britiſh*, and for an Intereſt truly *Britiſh*; and as we had Reaſon to be pleaſed with the Spirit which animated all our Proceedings, we ſhall for ever renounce our *Engliſh* Spirit, if we ſuffer ourſelves to fall into ſuch Diſcontent and murmuring upon this Occaſion, as may throw us once more upon ſuch dilatory and ineffectual Meaſures, as we ourſelves were formerly ſo loud in condemning.

Parties, which in Time of publick Tranquility are uſeful, and perhaps eſſential to our Conſtitution, are as deſtructive when we are threatened by a foreign Enemy. In War it is unavoidable, that Trade muſt ſuffer ſomething; that publick Credit ſhould be occaſionally damped; publick Impoſitions muſt encreaſe; and ſome ill Succeſſes muſt happen in the Courſe of the moſt proſperous Wars, which are apt to diſpirit the People; if to theſe neceſſary Inconveniencies, a factious and diſcontented Uneaſineſs be added, it is not difficult to perceive,

what a Clog the whole muſt be upon all our Operations. Whereas a national Union diffuſes a Life and Spirit into every Member of the State; it diffuſes a Satisfaction and a Firmneſs into the Military, even to its minuteſt Parts; and it encourages every Perſon in civil Life to bear his Part of the Burthen, when he ſees all the reſt drawing chearfully along with him.

But beſides the Humour of the People, which in all Affairs of Moment is ever of the greateſt Moment, it is highly neceſſary, when all the Care and Attention of the Miniſtry, is not more than ſufficient to ſupport the Nation, that no conſiderable Part of that Care ſhould be diverted to ſupport itſelf; whilſt they have Faction at home, as well as an Enemy abroad to manage. Experience has abundantly ſhewn, that ſuch Factions, at critical Times, have always operated to the Ruin of the Nation which nouriſhed them; ſometimes by forcing a Miniſter to paſs by every Inſult rather than engage in a War, whilſt he was torn by an inteſtine Diviſion; ſometimes to run raſhly upon a War, to avail himſelf of the Confuſion; ſometimes to patch up a Peace, more ruinous than any War; ſometimes to precipitate, and ſometimes to delay Matters, directed not by the Exigencies of Affairs abroad, but by thoſe at Home.

If the vigorous Steps we have already taken ſhould not prevent the Neceſſity of a War, the next Point to be conſidered is, how the Burthen of it is to be ſupported. Some of

thoſe who allow, that we ought to right ourſelves by Arms, from every other Conſideration, object to it becauſe we are unable to bear the Expence.

To form a ſolid Judgment upon this Point, we ought not to conſider our own Condition only without any further View. The Condition of the Enemy muſt be conſidered. It is true we are very conſiderably in Debt, but with that Debt, it is certain that we are better able to bear any Expence than any other Power now in *Europe*. None but *France* can come into any Competition with us. But is *France* not in Debt? Are not their neceſſary Charges incomparably greater than ours? Are not their People loaden with Taxes, oppreſſive in their Quantity and their Kind, and yet more oppreſſive, by their Manner of laying them on and collecting them? Have they been the beſt Oeconomiſts in the World? Or has any publick Money been raiſed amongſt them for a long Time paſt, without Murmuring and Diſcontent? Is their Credit to raiſe Money upon an Emergency greater than ours? And are they without internal Diviſions, the more deſtructive, as they ſubſiſt in a State where they are unnatural?

It is a great Miſtake, that arbitrary Governments are more abundant in their Reſources than free States. I am ſure all Experience is to the contrary. For free States have always expended more by far, in Proportion to their natural Advantages, than thoſe which were not

not free. In free Nations, when they are not extremely divided, every Individual is concerned in the publick Tranſactions; and thinks himſelf ſo. In Forms of this Kind, there really exiſts ſuch a Thing as the Publick, and therefore all Property is in ſome Sort publick too, ſince every Man is ſatisfied, that what is expended, is expended for the Benefit of himſelf, and his Family; and here Self-love fortifies the general Principle. In arbitrary Governments, it is true, the Prince may command at his Pleaſure the Lives and Properties of all thoſe who are ſubjected to him. But even the Principle which ſupports abſolute Power, can only bear a determinate Weight, and that not a very heavy one; free Countries are uſually more largely taxed; yet, Taxations have cauſed more frequent Murmurings, and even Seditions in the Regions of arbitrary Power. Here it is, that the great Difference between what is *taken*, and what is *given* makes itſelf to be felt. The People under arbitrary Governments are not a proper Object of heavy Taxes; and every Body knows, that all Impoſitions upon Goods, when carried beyond a certain Point, are ſure to contradict their own Purpoſes.

If ſuch be the Condition of *France*, ſome may, perhaps, imagine we are ourſelves in a yet worſe Condition.

In all Queſtions concerning the Power of the Nation, the Reaſoning is generally influenced by a Conſideration of the Nation Debt;

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no Scheme of Operation is propoſed, but this comes like an evil Spirit, to haunt our Imaginations, and diſtract us from our Purpoſe. It will, therefore, I believe, be far from impertinent here, to make ſome Remarks upon that Debt, and enquire how far the Conſideration of it ought to diſcourage us upon this intereſting Occaſion; for, if it can be ſhewn, notwithſtanding ſome Inconveniences, which muſt naturally wait on all human Inventions, that, upon the whole, the national Debt is rather a Support than a Burthen to us; and, if it be ſufficiently clear, that we bear all the indubitable Marks of a moſt opulent People, I ſuppoſe, it will not be thought impoſſible for us to find ſuch Reſources, as may ſupport us in the Proſecution of a neceſſary War: I ſay neceſſary War, becauſe no Nation is, or can be in a proper Condition, to reject reaſonable Terms of Accommodation, in the Hopes of getting more by the Iſſue of a War, in which there can be nothing certain, but the Bloodſhed and Expence.

Our Debt not only anſwers that internal End of good Policy, for which it was originally calculated, but it anſwers a ſimilar End externally too, in attaching many abroad to us, by the Part they take in that Intereſt, in which they have embarked their own.

A ſimilar Policy has been ſucceſsfully uſed by other States; the *Genoeſe* Nobility, have long, not only been ſuffered, but encouraged to acquire large landed Property in the Kingdom

dom of *Naples*, and in the Spirit of the ſame Policy it is, that all Alienation is moſt ſtrictly forbidden them, except in Favour of Nobles of their own Nation; the Rulers of that Kingdom do not conſider how much of its Revenues are neceſſarily carried abroad by this Means: They are glad to purchaſe, at ſo eaſy a Rate, a certain Intereſt in a Republick, which, by its Situation, is always of ſuch Importance in the Troubles of *Italy*.

But our Policy, as it is juſter, ſo it is more effectual too, the Freedom of ſelling out, in our Funds, is, in Reality, one of the principal Streams that fills them; and by the Credit we have gained from the Strength of our Security, and the Juſtice, and punctuality of our Payments, we extend our Reſources beyond the Wealth of our own Nation; and lay foreign States under a Sort of Contribution to us upon an Emergency.

Suppoſe it ſhould be found neceſſary, at any Time, to make ſudden, as well as great Preparations for War: To form a large naval Equipment: To raiſe a numerous Military, and to enter into expenſive Engagements with Allies abroad: What ſhould we do? impoſe what Taxes you pleaſe, they, muſt have Time to come in;—but the Exigency preſſes.—— Here, if there was not a Plan, to proceed on, found effectual by Experience, a Scheme, to which money'd Men might reſort; Ties by which they are united; and a Diſcipline, by which they are perfected in the Arts and Po-

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licies of raiſing Money; it would have proved next to impoſſible to anſwer, in ſo compleat a Manner, the expenſive and haſty Calls of thoſe mighty Wars, which, during almoſt all the laſt Century, have engaged all *Europe*. And, indeed, if we had not contracted this Debt at the Time we did, the Nation muſt neceſſarily either have bowed under the Power of *France*, or have ſubmitted at once to ſuch enormous Taxations, as without being ſufficient to anſwer their Purpoſes, would have pump'd out the whole Wealth of the Nation at a few Strokes; but by chuſing rather to go into Debt, our Taxations with a longer Continuance have been more moderate; Peace ſhares the Burthen of the War; and the whole is moderated by being extended.

It is true, that the Diſcontented never forget to remind us, that the two laſt Princes of the *Stuart* Family contracted no Debt, and that they left the Nation clear and unburthened at the Revolution. But in Fact, thoſe very Princes are, in a great Meaſure, the Authors of the Neceſſity of this Debt; for by the Indolence of one, and the falſe Politicks of both, they raiſed the Power of *France* to ſuch an immoderate Height, that no moderate Expence was ſufficient to bound it; had they made an early Oppoſition, it might have been a leſs Expenſive one; but at any Rate to make an effectual Oppoſition, and at the ſame Time, not to overſtrain the Sinews of the Nation, by a ſudden and violent Exertion of its Strength,

a Debt muſt have been contracted; this has been done ſince; and the Character of the Nation abroad, and its flouriſhing State at home, juſtify us in what we have done.

Since the firſt Formation of the national Debt, our Commerce has been extending, our Manufactures improving, our Agriculture increaſing, and with them, our People multiplying daily; now it is certain, that a Debt gradually growing for above Half a Century, until it has ſtretched beyond ſeventy Millions, can never be a Thing indifferent to a Nation; it can never be unoperative, it muſt be productive of Good, or of Evil; and if it can be demonſtrated, that under this Debt, we have advanced in every Reſpect, and that we have advanced by quicker Steps, than we have ever done, in the ſame Length of Time before, it is ſurely a very fair Preſumption, that our Debt is a principal Cauſe of our Increaſe; and I would demand of any Perſon verſed in the commercial and funded Syſtems of this Kingdom, if the Whole of the Latter ſhould ceaſe, even by a Payment, whether it would not ſenſibly prejudice the Former?

But beſides this, there is another, and as important Conſideration, which ſhews the Uſefulneſs, and almoſt Neceſſity of a national Debt; there is ſo much Wealth accumulated in many Parts of *Europe*, as well as among ourſelves, more than can well be employed in Trade, that there muſt be a general well eſtabliſhed Depoſitory of Credit ſomewhere, if

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we are not that Depoſitory, ſome other State will be ſo; and whereſoever that Credit is, there much Wealth, much Influence, much Power, muſt be of Courſe.

A very ſtinted Commerce in a barbarous Nation, may be ſupported by mere Barter; where the Trade is more inlarged, and the Intercourſe more general, Money is neceſſary; the antient Commerce probably went no further; but could our Trade at this Day ſtand on ſo narrow a Bottom? Could it ſubſiſt without Bills of Exchange, and the Credit from which they grow? By Means of theſe, Traders extend themſelves far beyond what their meer Capitals would carry them; funded Securities are national Bills of Exchange, and they, like the former, enable a Government to do what hardly any poſſible Sums of Money could, at the ſame Time that they add to the Riches of the Nation, a new Kind of Wealth; a Wealth, far from Imaginary, as ſome have called it, ſince it has the whole Strength of this Nation to ſupport it, and can even landed Property promiſe itſelf a great Security?

And it carries with it an Advantage of its own; for the Eaſineſs of transferring Stock, makes this Property as ſolid as Land, paſs as readily in all Sorts of large Payments as Money itſelf: Partaking thus, the Nature and Benefit both of fixt aud moveable Goods.

To ſerve the Exigences of an extenſive and various Trade, Money itſelf becomes too confined, and burthenſome; and amongſt a great

People, where many are born to Opulence, and many arrive at it, by other Methods than thoſe of Trade; another Credit, beſides that of Trade, is wanting: A Credit, that ſhall be common to all, and fit to unite the various Syſtems, which compoſe a great, learned, and trading Nation; and to carry all of them to an Height attainable only by ſuch an Union.

There are no trading and free Nations, which have not contracted a large Debt; among other Cauſes to which Sir *William Temple* attributed the Power of the *United Provinces*, he mentions their Debt as one and a principal one. *Genoa* owed the Temperament of its Government, its internal Order, and its foreign Reputation to that Debt which formed the Foundation of the Bank of St. *George*. *Machiavel*, one well acquainted with this State, and no mean Perſon in this Science, expreſsly ſays ſo; and even in our own Days they have derived all their Nouriſhment from this Source, even after the Decline of their Commerce, and the almoſt total Extinction of their Power

I know it is objected, that this Currency of the Stocks is but imaginary; that whilſt the Nation is at Peace, it has the Effect of real Money; but, upon the leaſt Danger, it ſinks into nothing; and if an Enemy once invades the Kingdom, then, like fairy Money, it would be found but Duſt and Aſhes. To this I think the Anſwer is plain, and in the

Affirmative,

Affirmative,—It would ſo. But then I would gladly know, in a Country that is the Seat of War, is there not every where, and has there not been at all Times, a univerſal Diſappearance of Money, and a compleat Stagnation of all Buſineſs? on a Peace, this Money begins gradually to re-appear, and ſure it is no worſe in the Caſe of the Funds: When Peace is reſtored, publick Credit revives, and the Stocks have their former Value.

The riſing and falling of Stocks is objected to them, whereas the Value of Money is ſaid to be fixed. It is granted—but in Countries and Times where no publick Funds are found, Complaints of the Deficiency of the Money are very frequent: Whatever falls the Stocks, is, where there are no Stocks, a Cauſe to make money'd Men unwilling to lend out their Money. In both Caſes there is a Loſs, there is an Inconvenience, and but a ſmall Difference in their Circumſtances; in one, the Stock-holder ſells under Par; in the other, the Borrower gives more than the common Intereſt. I have here, for Argument's Sake, allowed the worſt that could happen to the Stocks, tho' I do not remember at any Times, no not even at the higheſt Pitch of the late Rebellion, I do not remember that the Stocks ever were below Par.

I do not know that any Nation has entered into a conſiderable War, to which the Difficulty of raiſing Supplies to carry it on, has not been made a capital Objection; the Reſources,

ſources did not always immediately appear, but Neceſſity has been a Maſter, and the Exigencies themſelves have taught the Expedients.

To enter into a minute Diſcuſſion of all the Ways and Means which might be ſuggeſted for carrying on the War, in Caſe we ſhould be obliged to enter into one, would not only be a very uncertain Enquiry, but an impertinent one too, when we are not called upon to do it. Let theſe Sort of Things ſtand upon what Footing they will, the Attempt always carries with it ſomething of Ridicule; and it is no Way ſurpriſing, ſince it is hardly poſſible to lay down any ſure Abſtract Plan for Supplies, until the Juncture calls for them; for it muſt not only be conſidered, how large a Tax the Wealth of a People can anſwer, and in what Manner it had beſt be raiſed, but what their Genius and Temper can bear, muſt be conſidered too; and 'tis well known they will bear at one Time, and on one Occaſion, what at other Times and Occaſions they would never endure; all theſe Things, and many more, muſt be taken into Conſideration, before the Buſineſs of Calculation can be depended upon; otherwiſe 'tis only begging the Queſtion; and with all the Appearance of Mathematical Certainty, is the moſt fallacious of all Methods of Reaſoning, and the beſt adapted to conceal Errors from vulgar Obſervation. One plain Fact, one clear Proof that we are a rich Nation, will go further to demonſtrate to every Underſtanding,

ing, that we are able to carry on the War, even where Ways and Means don't readily appear, than a Thouſand the moſt curious Schemes for raiſing Money, where that can't be ſhewn; if I am to undertake an expenſive Building, it will go further to perſuade myſelf, and others too, of my Ability to carry it on; if I can ſhew a moral Certainty of my having ten thouſand Pounds in my ſtrong Box, though the Key ſhould be loſt or miſlaid, and we ſhould be a little puzzled to get at the Money; than if a Conſultation of the ableſt Lock-ſmiths in *England*, had contrived the moſt effectual Ways and Means to open the Box; but that ſtill it remained very doubtful, whether there was any Thing to be found it it, when opened.

It is curious to hear the Complaints of ſome Men, of the Miſery to which we are reduced, *beggared*, *ruined*, *undone*, *deſolated*, *exhauſted*, you would fancy they were talking of the wretched Inhabitants of ſome ſad Region of *Siberia*; but all this is ſpoken of *England*, in the midſt of *England*, in the midſt of the moſt exuberant Plenty; the moſt flouriſhing Trade, the moſt unbounded Luxury, that has been perhaps ever ſeen in any Country of the Globe: Is not the Wealth of our Gentry almoſt proverbial all over *Europe*, by their Expences abroad, and the Grandeur of their Living at home? Does not the Subſtance of our Tradeſmen come to rival it? Do not our common People, even to the loweſt, partake

every

Neceſſary, and every comfortable Proviſion of Life, beyond any of their Claſs in the known World? They too have their own Luxuries, ſuited to their Taſte, and quite unknown to all of their Rank in other Nations? Our Wealth is diffuſed through every Part of the Community, Men and Dogs may drink it till they burſt; and can it be thought in a Nation ſo rich, no Means can be found to get Part of that Money for publick and national Uſes, and to divert the Current from idle Luxury, into Channels really beneficial to the Nation.

From theſe Conſiderations we may depend upon Reſources, which, if well ſtudied in the Manner of raiſing, diſtributed with Oeconomy, and applied to their Uſes with Vigour and Prudence, may promiſe all that Succeſs, with which Providence is uſually pleaſed to crown a juſt Cauſe, whoſe Supporters are not wanting to themſelves; and that they will be ſo raiſed, and ſo managed, I do not think we have as yet any the leaſt Reaſon to doubt. I defy any Body to ſhew, in any Country, or in any Age, ſuch great Preparations, in ſo ſhort a Time; ſo many Things carried on by Land and by Sea; in the Way of open Force, and in that of Negotiation. But we have done more, we have not only been preparing, but we have been acting too. And now, in little more than a Year, ſince the firſt Beginnings of this Rupture, have done more towards damaging and diſheartening the Enemy, more towards procuring an uſeful Peace, or defray-

ing

ſing the Expences of a War, than our Anceſtors have done, in any the moſt ſhining Period of our Hiſtory. With this material Difference beſides in our Favour, that, at the Time when they fought ſucceſsfully againſt *France*, they took her at a Time when ſhe was much diſabled, and at beſt much leſs extended, and leſs entire than ſhe is at this Day. This, without Suſpicion of Flattery, may be ſaid for thoſe at the Helm, and cannot, I am ſure, be denied without Malice.

But taking the Neceſſity of vigorous Meaſures for granted, and taking it for granted too, that we are well able to ſupport ourſelves in them; a Queſtion ſtill ariſes upon the beſt Manner of carrying on the War. There are ſome who think we ought to confine ourſelves to a naval one, and that it is againſt Reaſon, and Prudence for us to take any Part, in the Tranſactions on the Continent. I ſhall ſtate their Arguments with all the Strength and Fairneſs in my Power, and then deliver my own Sentiments upon them in the beſt Manner I am able.

In the firſt Place, they obſerve, that we are an Iſland; that this Circumſtance makes it an extremely difficult, chargeable, and hazardous Undertaking for any foreign Enemy to invade this Kingdom; eſpecially as we have, for the Defence of our Coaſt, a very numerous and well-appointed Fleet, far exceeding every Thing, which our Enemies could employ againſt us of the ſame Kind. Whilſt we are

thus ſecured from all Danger at home! we are at full Liberty to exert our natural Strength; we can bombard their maritime Towns; we can block up their Ports; we can intercept their Commerce, and thus cut off that Nouriſhment without which War cannot ſubſiſt in either Element. Secondly, by this Method of purſuing the War; the Expence, however great, does not exhauſt the Nation. The Money circulates among ourſelves; and ſuch a War inſtead of draining us of our Caſh, and caſting a Damp upon Buſineſs, really ſets many uſeful Trades a-float, and turns a Part of the Money of the Nation into Channels which would otherwiſe be dry, and uſeleſs to the Kingdom. Again they argue; that if we meddle upon the Continent, and make the Balance of Power, the Pretext for that meddling, we muſt ſuppoſe the *Dutch*, the *Germanic* Body, and other Powers to be in much more immediate Danger than we are; and if they are really in ſuch Danger, they muſt be ſenſible of it; and if they are ſenſible of it, they muſt join their Forces to guard againſt it; and if they join their Forces, they are ſufficiently able to defend themſelves, without Armies or Subſidies from us; but that we, by following a chimerical Idea of the Balance of Power, and engaging in other idle political Projects, have entered into Quarrels in Favour of Princes, who never thought themſelves Principals in them; and have bribed People with our Money and our Blood, to the

Defence

Defence of their own Lives and their own Properties.

The Arguments, on which this Notion of our being utterly unconnected with the Continent, are founded, flatter our national Humour, and they derive a Force from thence, and from their being often and confidently aſſerted, which they have not from their Reaſonableneſs, and which, perhaps, no Reaſoning could give them. Thoſe who are originally at the Trouble of ſpreading ſuch Opinions, do not themſelves give Credit to them: But they anſwer a preſent End, and form a plauſible Topic, and that is all *they* deſire. I am fully ſatisfied, that no Man who has examined this Matter, wants any new Arguments to ſatisfy him on which Side of the Queſtion he ought to decide. But many take up their Notions upon a very ſlight Examination, and theſe remain in their Errors; becauſe Men of Refinement have rarely Compliance enough to more common Underſtandings, to take Pains to argue particularly upon Points which are to themſelves ſufficiently clear already; it is for this Reaſon I ſhall ſpend a little Time in examining this Queſtion, which whether it be of great Difficulty, or not, is certainly of great Importance to us.

I readily admit, that if we could detach ourſelves entirely from the Continent, and could terminate all our Diſputes in the Manner we are beſt able, by a maritime War, it

would be infinitely the moſt eligible upon all Accounts. But there is a Difficulty in this Caſe. We cannot determine by ourſelves in what Manner we ſhall make War. The Enemy muſt have his Part in the Deliberation. And the Reaſons which induce us to wiſh for a Naval War, becauſe it is eaſieſt for us; will incline him to a Land War, becauſe it is the worſt for us, and more convenient for him.

The Queſtion then is narrowed to one Point; whether we, purſuing our Choice, or *France* proceeding in the Way of her Strength, ſhe or we be in the better Road to that Point, which is the common Aim of both? Let us ſuppoſe, that, in Purſuance of the favourite Maxim, we take no Meaſures to oppoſe the Enemy on the Continent. In theſe Circumſtances let us ſuppoſe War declared, and Hoſtilities commenced upon both Sides. That our Fleets have put to Sea, and that the *French* Armies have taken the Field. It is pretty certain, that whether the *French* choſe to act upon the Side of the Low Countries, or on that of *Germany*, they could meet but little effectual Reſiſtance on either. Thoſe numerous and celebrated Fortifications in the former, many ruined, and all neglected, could ſerve to no other Purpoſe, than to afford an Exerciſe to their Troops, and an Eclat to the Rapidity of their Conqueſts. If, in the laſt War, when they were in perfect Order, were well garriſoned, and had a numerous Army of the Allies in the Field to relieve them, if

then

then they could not ward off their Fate for above three Campaigns, nor prevent the Marſhals *Saxe* and *Lowendahl* from burſting open the Sanctuary of the *United Provinces*; Is it probable, that now, ungarriſoned, unfortified, neglected, almoſt abandoned as they are, they could hold out even for a ſingle Campaign? or prevent the *Hollanders*, weakened by a Series of internal Diſorders, and divided by the moſt ruinous Factions, from throwing themſelves into the Arms of *France*, and entering into ſuch Engagements, as the unfortunate Circumſtances of all, and the Inclinations of but too many amongſt them, might induce them to conſent to? *Holland*, feeble in itſelf, and a broken Reed for us to lean on, would be a Rod to chaſtiſe all *Europe* in the Hands of *France*.

If *France* ſhould turn her Arms to the Side of the Empire, we have very convincing Experience how little that divided Body, or rather that Chaos of inconſiſtent Parts could reſiſt ſuch a compacted Force. There are Princes in that Quarter who would find their Account in throwing every Thing into the utmoſt Confuſion. So that, let the Power of *France* be turned which Way it will, it is next to an abſolute Certainty, that, without our Interpoſition, it muſt prevail and gain every Day an Acceſſion of new Power. All this, and much more might be done, even in one Campaign. Let us ſee now, what amends our Naval Force could make for theſe Loſſes,

ſuppoſing

ſuppoſing our Endeavours crowned with all the Succeſs we could poſſibly wiſh; ſuppoſe that not one *French* Man of War dares put to Sea; or if that be more favourable, let us ſuppoſe that they ſhould be hardy enough to engage us; and that by this Raſhneſs, they ſhould loſe twenty Ships of the Line; ſuppoſe vaſt Numbers of their Merchantmen taken, and their whole Commerce interrupted. I will ſuppoſe too, that we make ſucceſsful Deſcents upon the Coaſts, and pillage the Country for a conſiderable Way. Will any one ſay, we could promiſe ourſelves a Succeſs greater than this? Yet will any be confident enough to aſſert, that all this could balance the Loſs we ſhould ſuffer, by letting the *French* take the Courſe they pleaſe, to diſtreſs our Allies, and in the End our own Nation?

For ſurely we do not imagine, that *France*, by this Acceſſion of Territory, and the Influence following a Train of Succeſs, will not, nay muſt not grow into a conſiderable naval Strength. She might for a while keep her Fleets at home, and acquieſce under a temporary Loſs for the Sake of a laſting Advantage; having conquered, cheated, terrified, and bribed half *Europe*, might turn the Funds ſhe now imploys on the Land Service to the Encreaſe of her Marine; beſides the vaſt Supplies, which might be drawn from another maritime Power, now become her Friend and Ally. Do we forget the aſtoniſhing naval Armaments of *Louis* XIV? Have we taken no

Notice

Notice of the prodigious Encreaſe of the *French* Marine ſince the laſt War? Or ſhall we pretend Ignorance of the conſtant Attention of that Court to encreaſe it yet further? And if, in the Reign of *Louis* XIV. in the Infancy of their Commerce, raw as they were in the Art of building Ships, inexpert in their Management, and ſtinted to what they are now in the Number of Hands proper to Man them; if then, they terrified us with the Greatneſs of their naval Force, actually under Sail to invade us, and this, at a Time, that *Holland* was our cloſe Ally, was armed with a real Strength, and was hearty in the Uſe of it; what ought we to apprehend now from the Marine of *France*, already not contemptible, encreaſed by Alliance, formerly ours, and raiſed to ſuch a Pitch as the whole Force of that great Empire, diverted into this one Channel, could raiſe it? We might then, notwithſtanding our *Inſular* Policy, find the Power of *France* but too near us; we might then diſcover, when the Enemy had penetrated into the Body of the Place, that a Defence of the Out-works was ſomething elſe than a waſting of our Strength.

There is a very material Difference between the Operations of a Sea, and a Land War; and I am ſurpriſed that it is not conſidered in this Caſe, more deeply than it commonly is. At Land, a certain Force may always depend upon a certain determinate Succeſs, in Proportion to that Force; for an Army greatly inferior

can

can very little check the Career of that which prevails extremely in Number; it can afford no Relief to the Towns which are beſieged, and may at laſt be compelled to fight to its own certain Deſtruction, or be obliged entirely to evacuate the Country. But at Sea, we can never inſure ourſelves even a Meeting with the Enemy; Fogs, contrary Winds, the Uncertainty of the Longitude, all theſe, and many more Auxiliaries may fight for the weaker Side. If you block up a Port, it does not depend upon you, how long this Blockade may continue. A Storm may drive you off the Coaſt. Nor is it poſſible on Account of the Danger to remain long hovering over any Coaſt. Whenever therefore any of theſe Cauſes leave the Port open, the inferior Navy ſails out, and acts in ſuch a Manner, as its Affairs require and its Strength can execute. It may tranſport Troops into a diſtant Part of the World; act againſt its Enemies in the *Eaſt* or *Weſt Indies*, ſhould they have Settlements there; or fall in upon their Trade, however protected by Convoys. In a Land War, ſuppoſe a great Superiority of Force, and the Event is certain; in a naval War no Superiority can enſure even a Meeting with the Enemy; ſo that, waving every other Conſideration, in a War carried on upon the Principles of ſome of our Schemiſts; the *French* may depend upon a certain determinate Succeſs, *as if they are not oppoſed by us upon the Continent they undoubtedly may*; whereas

whereas our Succeſs muſt be as uncertain as the Element in which it is waged.

The ſecond Objection to our taking Part upon the Continent from the greater Expence falls, if the firſt cannot ſtand. If a War on the Continent be *neceſſary*, it muſt be ſupported, or we are actually unequal to our own Protection. We are Tenants at Will; being even a Nation, but at the good Pleaſure of our Enemies. Thanks to Providence, this is far from our Caſe; we are well able to traverſe the Deſigns of *France* upon the Continent; and when we have ſecured that Point, and kept their Hands full in that Quarter, we can then employ all the great Power we derive from our Situation to annoy the Enemy. But it will be ſaid; if we are thus perpetually to meddle upon the Continent, of what Advantage is our Situation? What! is the Number of our excellent Ports, which form our Naval Strength, of no Advantage to us? Is the Difficulty of being invaded no Advantage to us? And is it no Advantage to be exempted from the Neceſſity of immenſe ſtanding Armies, and an extenſive Frontier to be fortified and kept up at incredible Charges? Theſe are Circumſtances highly favourable, but they do not by any Means render us abſolutely impenetrable, and invulnerable, nor exempt us from attending to many other Things, which a ſenſible Foreſight and Precaution dictate.

As to the third Objection, that may *appear* to have more Weight, which if it *really* had,

it would be retroactive, and ſtrengthen the others. The Princes of the Empire, the *Dutch*, and many other Powers of *Europe*, are nearer the Danger than we are, and if united to prevent it, might very probably be ſufficient for the Undertaking; but the Point is, have we any Reaſon to believe they will ſo unite; if their real ſolid Intereſt was clearly and diſpaſſionately conſidered by them, the Conſequences, it is poſſible, might be ſuch an Union; but there are in the Views of all Councils, a nearer and remoter Intereſt, which are very frequently oppoſed to each other; and in moſt Councils the Majority is often operated upon by the nearer; we have ſcarce ever heard of any State which has refuſed a preſent glaring Advantage, or refuſed to form Connections in Conſequence of it; though it might have been demonſtrated that this Advantage, and theſe Connections, would, in a Century, prove the Ruin of that State. It is a great Miſtake, that Nations, any more than private Men, are ſolely influenced by a Conſideration of their real Intereſts. Thoſe who oppoſe our preſent Meaſures contend, that we are now acting againſt our own; and will they be ſurprized to find, others acting from no wiſer Motives?

But they who reaſon upon ſuch a ſuppoſed Union, do not know, or do not at all conſider the Nature and Conſtitution of the *Germanic* Body; in this, there is another Balance, beſides the general Balance of *Europe*, which produces

produces other Connections, and other Enmities. The Power of *France* does not appear ſo formidable to many of the *German* Sovereigns, as that of the Houſe of *Auſtria*. That of *France* is abroad, the other is at home, and to ſeveral by far more odious. Beſides that, their ſeveral petty Pretenſions on each other, their mutual Jealouſies, Piques, Reſentments, their perſonal Affronts, and national Averſions, muſt prove unſurmountable Bars to any Union for their common Defence. The very uniting of one Part of that Body in one Cauſe, would prove a a ſufficient Reaſon for a contrary Union in the ſame Body, to oppoſe it: Not to mention, that the Intrigues and Money of *France* have as much Influence in the Empire as ours; and *would probably have the ſame, though we ſhould never think of doing any Thing to counter-act them, by the Uſe of the ſame Methods.* When was it known, that the Princes upon the Continent of *Europe*, or elſewhere, have always united or divided, as the general Intereſt of *Europe*, or of any other Syſtem, ought to have directed them? In what Conjuncture was ſuch an Union more wanting than in the Year 1683, when the Grand Vizier penetrated into the Empire itſelf, and lay with a mighty and victorious Army before the Walls of *Vienna?* At that Time, when a moſt potent, and at the ſame Time a moſt barbarous Enemy, the Enemy of Liberty, Learning, Arts, and Induſtry, the avowed, principled Enemy of the *Chriſtian*

Name, was juſt on the Point of removing the only Bar, which could hinder him from over-running the greateſt Part of *Europe*; at that Time, we might have expected all *Germany* at leaſt, as the next in Danger, to be in Arms, and united to a Man; we might have expected a Confederacy of all the *Chriſtian* Princes to guard againſt an Evil, ſcarce one Degree removed from them. But was this the Caſe? Were ſuch Confederacies formed? Far from it. Almoſt all Parties looked on coolly; and waited the Event with the ſame Indifference, with which we attend the Cataſtrophe of a Performance at the Theatre. Indeed, whoever beſtows the leaſt Attention to the State of *Europe*, muſt eaſily and painly ſee, that there can never be any reaſonable Hope of an Union, ſufficient to withſtand the Power of *France*, unleſs we form the Cement of it. Unleſs we give it a Subſtance, and animate it too, it can only be the Shadow, the Picture of an Union. And I much fear, that thoſe who are for leaving the Princes upon the Continent, to take Care each of his own particular Safety, have very little Regard to ours, whatever they may pretend. Should we follow their Counſels, *France* might now with great Reaſon boaſt that Advantage which *Rome* had formerly (*nec aliud adverſus validiſſamas nationes pro nobis utilius, quam quod in commune non conſulunt*) and ſhe might moſt certainly draw the ſame Effects from it.

Whenever

Whenever a Nation truſts to thoſe Advantages, which ſhe owes ſolely to ſome Circumſtance in her Situation, ſhe muſt infallibly ſuffer by it in the End, if ſhe is engaged with a bold and vigilant Enemy. For there can be no Advantage of that Sort, which may not be rendered uſeleſs by ſome Policy of him who attacks. And when we have for a long Time repoſed all our Truſt upon any one Bottom, on the firſt Failure of that, all our Courage is generally loſt, and we ſeem to have no other Reſource.

When *Alexander* the Great projected the Reduction of *Tyre*; that common Wealth repoſed, and not without Reaſon, a great Confidence in her Situation; it was an Iſland, ſtrongly fortified, ſtrongly garriſoned, and abounding with military Stores and Proviſions in the greateſt Plenty. She had beſides a very powerful Navy, and *Alexander* at this Time had none. But we do not find, that ſhe had any Allies, or that ſhe took any effectual Meaſures to obtain them, in theſe Circumſtances however, *Tyre* ſeemed impregnable. But ſuch was the Genius and Application of *Alexander*, that he projected a Work that removed one of the greateſt Advantages of this City. He made a Mole from the Continent to the Foot of the Walls of *Tyre*, and was thus in a Condition to batter and aſſault the Place directly. The Aſtoniſhment cauſed by ſuch a vaſt Work, anſwered half the Purpoſe of it. In the mean Time, the riſing Reputation of this Conqueror, the Jealouſy

louſy of other maritime States to that of *Tyre*, and other Motives now unknown, induced ſeveral of the Neighbouring Nations to unite their Fleets under his Flag. Theſe Fleets engaged with that of *Tyre*, and Fortune decided the Victory in their Favour. Here fell, at once, all the Advantages ariſing from the Situation of that City. It was now attacked with the ſame Eaſe with any other. And, notwithſtanding the Obſtinacy of the Reſiſtance, it fell in a ſhort Time into the Hands of an incenſed Conqueror.

Had this wealthy and trading City, when ſhe was reſolved to keep no Meaſures with *Alexander*, ſent Ambaſſadors to confederate all the neighbouring States, to join unanimouſly and heartily in their common Defence; had they rouſed the *Phenicians*; had they animated the *Jews*; had they given proper Succours to the Governor of *Ægypt*; and enabled all to form a proper Body to act on the Land Side, whilſt with a powerful Fleet, they had attempted to cut off *Alexander*'s Succours, and over-awed all the Coaſt; had they opened their Treaſures to bring a large Body of *Arabians*, whom their Money would have engaged, to harraſs their Enemy, and retard his Operations. Had they done this, and whatever elſe Prudence, and the Circumſtances of the Time would have ſuggeſted, I believe there is no Man who would not have thought they had conſulted their Safety far better, than by confiding in their ſingle Strength, and the Nature

of

of their Situation, conſiderable as the one, and advantageous as the other, was; and if, after all, they had fallen, they would have had the Honour with all Poſterity of having made a Defence worthy the Grandeur and Antiquity of their City.

In examining ancient Hiſtory, one frequently meets, in the Accounts of Sieges, that Towns and Fortreſſes have been very often taken, in thoſe Parts, which Nature ſeemed to have made impenetrable; ſuch Advantages to imprudent Men are ſo many Prejudices, becauſe they abate the Vigilance of the Defenders, and make them neglect other Means of Defence. Modern Story is not without Inſtances of the ſame Kind. *Gibralter*, ſo ſecured by its Situation, that it might laugh at a Siege, was taken by Surpriſe by an Handful of Seamen. In ſhort, their is always ſome Flaw in all natural Advantages, which no-body ſuſpects until it is fatally diſcovered, and all Hopes of amending it, are utterly gone. So that a prudent Man will make the moſt of all Advantages which Nature has given him; but at the ſame Time he will take all the Steps to ſecure himſelf, that he ſhould, had he theſe Advantages in a ſmaller Degree, or not at all. I mean ſo as not idly to diſſipate his Strength.

To come home to our own Affairs. Was it ever known, that we were engaged in a War with *France*, that Power with which we ever were, and ever muſt be embroiled, when we did not endeavour by every Means, and

even

even by Means of our Money, to procure as many Allies as we poſſibly could? Were we ever unconnected even with the minuteſt Concerns of the Dutchies of *Burgundy* and *Britany*, whilſt theſe States ſubſiſted? The firſt *Edward*, one of the ableſt Princes who ever filled the Throne of this Kingdom, knew what a formidable Enemy he had to cope with in *France*, even in the Condition it then was; and he knew perfectly well by what Means to cope with her. He did not decline all Engagements on the Continent, and content himſelf with fitting out Fleets to harraſs the Coaſt of *France*; he gained to his Intereſt the Earl of *Flanders*, *Adolphus* of *Naſſau*, the Emperor, the Duke of *Auſtria*, the Archbiſhop of *Cologne*, and ſeveral other Princes of *Germany*; the Dukes of *Brabant*, the Earls of *Holland*, *Juliers* and *Luxemburg*, who were (ſays the Hiſtorian) engaged in the League by the Great Sums *Edward* was to furniſh them with. The third of that Name, was full as fond of connecting himſelf with the Continent, and for the ſame Reaſons, he ſecured (to uſe the Words of the ſame Writer) in his Intereſts, the Emperor *Lewis* of *Bavaria*, the Duke of *Brabant*, the Earls of *Guilder* and *Hainault*, his Brother-in-law the Archbiſhop of *Cologne*, and ſeveral other *German* Princes; he omitted not the private Succours of divers Lords of *Germany*, *Flanders*, *Holland*, *Brabant*, and *Gaſcoign*, who were to furniſh him with a Number of Horſe, in Proportion to the Sums

he

he gave them. What a Field would ſuch a Proceeding at this Day have opened to the *popular Declaimer*; how pathetically would he have complained *in every Harangue* "to ſee "not only ſo many ſovereign, and ſo many "ſubordinate Princes, and not only Princes, "but petty Lords, ſubſidized almoſt all over "*Europe*, in *Germany*, in the *Low Countries*, in "*France*, every where; and the Treaſure of "*England*, the vital Blood of the Nation, "ſtreaming from a thouſand Wounds, and "transfuſed into a thouſand foreign Chan-"nels." And yet at this Time *England* bore a much ſmaller Proportion in Point of Wealth to thoſe Countries, and a much larger one in Point of idle Hands, than ſhe does now, without all Compariſon; and notwithſtand, this Conduct of our Princes, has been cenſured by no Hiſtorian; on the contrary, it has ever been highly and juſtly commended, and held up as a Pattern to all ſucceeding Monarchs. The Example of *Edward* I. was followed by *Edward* III. *Henry* V. trod in the ſame Steps; and indeed all our Kings, except ſuch as were a Diſgrace to their Thrones, and a Misfortune to their People, never ſlighted the Continent, from the earlieſt Accounts we have, to the preſent moſt intereſting Period. And here I appeal to the Hearts of thoſe, who oppoſe our Treaties, whether they think we could do any Thing more acceptable to our Enemies, than to drop all Connection with the Continent, and renounce theſe ſubſidiary

Treaties, which they hold to be ſo prejudicial to us?

Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridæ.

I hardly think they would venture to affirm, that *France* wiſhes us the Continuance of thoſe Allies upon thoſe Terms; or, that ſhe has never attempted to prevent ſuch Alliances, as ſo many Hinderances to the Execution of her Schemes. Were they ſo ruinous to us, as ſome would repreſent them, and the Proceeding ſo irrational, the *French* would certainly rather encourage, or at leaſt would wink at ſuch a Procedure. We may know whether any Step againſt the Enemy be right, as well from his Eagerneſs to oppoſe, as from our own to take it.

Now if our wiſeſt and beſt Princes, in all Times, have judged a Connection with the Continent abſolutely neceſſary, and Alliances there to be ſo valuable, as to be purchaſed at the greateſt Expence; ſhall we ſuppoſe, that we are ſo much more powerful, and *France* ſo much weaker, and the Nature of all Things ſo much reverſed, that we ought now to truſt ſolely to our own Strength, and ſuffer the common Enemy, by Force or by Management, to make what Advances he can, whilſt we confine ourſelves to one ſingle Method of attacking him? Again, if this Enemy abroad has ſhewn, by his Oppoſition to our Alliances, that he looks upon them as prejudicial to him, and of Courſe uſeful to us, *what ſhall we*

think

think of thoſe, who with ſo much Rancour oppoſe thoſe Alliances, at home?

Perhaps it may be excepted to the Examples which I have given, that, in theſe early Times, we had leſs Trade, and a ſmaller Maritime Force than we now have; and that we were therefore under a Neceſſity, of taking the Part, which we then took upon the Continent. But, in anſwer to this, it muſt not be forgot, that we were then an Iſland, as well as now; and that we were equally well protected by our Situation from all Danger of an Invaſion. If we had not then conſiderable Fleets, yet our Fleets, when we thought proper to turn our Strength that Way, were more conſiderable than thoſe of *France*, as our Trade was, even at that Time. In the Reign of Queen *Elizabeth* we had a greater naval Force than any Power in *Europe* after the Defeat of the *Armada*; and yet that ſagacious Princeſs, and the wiſe Adviſers ſhe had, during the long Courſe of her memorable Reign, never thought they acted weakly in maintaining Armies, and expending conſiderable Sums upon the Continent. Indeed, had our Miniſtry deviated from theſe Maxims of ſound Policy, obſerved by all wiſe States, who never go to War without firſt looking out for Alliances; had they, when the Injuries we had ſuffered, and the Reſentment of the Nation called upon them to act in an hoſtile Manner, had they, neglected to ſecure us one Ally on the Continent; had they formed no Treaties, ſtipulated for

no Succours, but left *France* to the full Exertion of her prodigious Strength, and the full Employment of her dangerous Intrigues; then, indeed, the Terms of *weak and wicked Miniſter*, which is now but Cant, the Voice of reſtleſs Faction, and diſappointed Ambition, would have been a Charm to conjure up a deſtroying Spirit, to puniſh the Adviſers of ſuch a fool-hardy Proceeding. Thoſe who now accuſe them ſo bitterly for a contrary Conduct, have undoubtedly their own Reaſons for doing ſo. The Publick has long entertained an Opinion, that the principal Men in Oppoſition have ever, as one of their chief Ends, if not their ſole End, the Removal of the chief Men of the Miniſtry; and of filling themſelves their Places, with *Integrities and Abilities ſuperior*. This is undoubtedly a laudable Ambition; but if we judge of the Meaſures they would purſue, when in Power, as the direct contrary to thoſe which they oppoſe when out of Power, I believe few Men, who love their Country and underſtand its Intereſt, will wiſh for any Change which may put the Game into their Hands.

A Clamour is raiſed againſt the ſubſidiary Treaties, upon another Principle; mercenary Troops are condemned, upon the Authority of ſome political Writers, and the Example of ſome Miſchiefs, which have attended them recorded in Hiſtory. They obſerve, that when you ſuffer your own People to grow into a Diſuſe of Arms, and habituate them to commit

their

their Defence to Foreigners, they naturally become effeminate and cowardly, unwilling and unable to protect themſelves from their more avowed Enemies, or the Impoſition and Tyranny of thoſe whom they have hired to defend them. This Obſervation, as a general one, I allow to be extremely juſt. Thoſe who have the Sword in their Hand, and not thoſe who have the Purſe, are in Effect the Maſters; and thoſe who pay others to fight their Battles, out of Cowardice, will in the End have nothing left to pay; becauſe no Defence is ſolid, and to be relied on, but that which comes from the proper Strength of a Nation itſelf. I do not controvert the general Principle; but I poſitively deny the Fact as charged upon us; we have not truſted to foreign Defence, nor to mercenary Forces. Let thoſe who reproach us with this puſilanimous Conduct look over the Votes of this Seſſion of Parliament. They will find, that for the preſent Year we have thirty-four thouſand *Britiſh* Soldiers on Foot in *Great Britain*; we have in *Ireland* twelve thouſand at leaſt, all *Britiſh* too; we have ten thouſand in the Plantations, *Gibraltar* and *Minorca*, beſides the Troops raiſed in the Colonies; we have ten thouſand Marines, and forty thouſand *Britiſh* Seamen in our Navy. We have then upwards of an hundred thouſand *Britiſh* Subjects in Arms, in the different Parts of our military Eſtabliſhment. How then can we ſuffer the proſtitute Impudence of ſome Writers,

who

who ſay we have diſarmed and diſcouraged our own People, and committed our Defence to the Hands of mercenary Foreigners? If we have engaged with other Powers to furniſh us with Troops, it is becauſe a yet greater Force, than this I have mentioned, is neceſſary to counterbalance that of the Enemy; that theſe Troops are better ſituated to act in our Favour, upon many Occaſions, and can be maintained at an infinitely leſs Expence, than would ſerve to keep up half that Force of our own Subjects. But ſtill they urge the Danger ariſing from Mercenaries; that they are turbulent, diſobedient to their Commanders, and highly dangerous to the State which employs them. Examples from Antiquity are produced to ſupport this. But are there no Examples on the other Side? Did not the Kings of *Perſia* place a great and juſt Confidence in the *Greek* Mercenaries? And did not the younger *Cyrus*, in his Attempt upon the Throne of that Empire, rely on them above all others? Was not *Perſeus*, King of *Macedon*, ruined, when, to gratify a mean, avaricious Principle, he broke a Subſidy Treaty, which he had entered into with a neighbouring warlike Peope? And if the *Carthaginian* Republick was near being ruined by a Sedition of her mercenary Forces; let it be remembered likewiſe, that by its mercenary Forces this Republick was near being carried to univerſal Empire.

But let the Queſtion concerning the antient Mercenaries be decided which Way it will, according to its own Merits; it has no ſort of Concern with us at this Day. It is unfortunate, that any ſhould read Hiſtory, who are entirely deficient in Judgment, to apply Facts, and who have not Capacity ſufficient to take in all that Diverſity of Circumſtances and Relations which are eſſentially requiſite to the proper Uſe of any hiſtorical Example. In Reality, the Mercenaries mentioned in antient Writers were altogether of a Nature different from thoſe Forces, which confederate Princes engage to furniſh us with, on the Payment of certain ſtipulated Sums, at this Time. The antient Mercenaries were generally a Set of Soldiers of Fortune, detached from any Relation to their ſeveral Countries, often Fugitives from them, who entered into the Service of ſome foreign State, hoping to enrich themſelves by Pay or Plunder; and conſequently had no Ties which could hold them ſteadily to their Duty; ſuch were the Mercenaries in the *Carthaginian* Service, who mutinied under *Spendius* and *Matho*. No Man who had not oblique Views, to diſtort his Sight, could perceive any eſſential Likeneſs between the Employment of ſuch Forces, and a Subſidy Treaty. In the Caſe of a Subſidy Treaty, the Soldiers are under Obedience to their proper Prince; they are diſciplined by his Generals; they are paid out of his Treaſury; and they are accountable to him as Subjects for any

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Diſorders, they may commit. The antient Mercenaries had no Allegiance at home to ſecure them; and abroad had no Law but their Intereſt. In our Caſe, they are in no ſort mercenary Forces; our whole Buſineſs is with their Prince, whom we enable to ſerve us more effectually, by advancing him certain Sums of Money. If we are in no Danger from the Troops, who are very different from all that have ever been dangerous to their Employers, we can fear none from any ſiniſter Deſign of the Empreſs of *Ruſſia* or the Landgrave of *Heſſe Caſſel*. It is their Intereſt to uphold, and not to deſtroy thoſe, whoſe Cauſe is the ſame with their own, and who contribute their Share in the Support of that Cauſe. There is indeed one Caſe, wherein a ſubſidiary Treaty might be really of dangerous Conſequence. If we ſhould enter into an Engagement with a Prince, to furniſh Troops for our Defence, who had himſelf a very great Force, that Force very near us, and whoſe Situation, and Connexions might make it advantageous, and eaſy to him to uſe ſuch a Treaty, as an Inſtrument to enſlave us. As if we had entered into a Treaty of this kind with *France*. In ſuch a Caſe, it would be highly abſurd, either to give or to receive a Subſidy.

There is an Objection ſtill remaining againſt Subſidies, which is, I conceive, full as weak as the reſt. It is ſaid, that we can never be ſecure in ſuch an Alliance; the Friend who

is only ſo becauſe he is paid to be our Friend, will attach himſelf to the Enemy, for a greater Payment. To this I ſhall only anſwer, that in every thing we do, we can have but a Probability of Succeſs. And, ſince it is impoſſible we ſhould have more, wiſe Men always acquieſce in that, and think themſelves ſufficiently ſecure when the Probability is ſtrong in their Favour. And if the moſt indubitable Intereſt of Princes, the Experience of their paſt Conduct, the Faith of the moſt ſolemn Treaties, and a Subſidy into the Bargain, be not a Security for their Steadineſs, I own I cannot ſee what human Prudence can do towards ſecuring an Ally. But People have firſt called the Troops, ſtipulated in ſuch Alliances, *Mercenaries*, and to that Idea have affixed thoſe of Venality and Perfidiouſneſs, without the leaſt Foundation of Fact, or Experience. On ſuch an Occaſion it is uſual with theſe Gentlemen to cry up a National Militia, who, being incorruptible, and fighting for all that is dear to them, would have a Courage infinitely ſuperior to thoſe who fight only for Pay.

The Militia, is one of the niceſt Queſtions in our national Policy; becauſe it ſeems to carry a Dilemma with it, let us determine which Way, we will: On what Footing to ſettle the Militia, ſo as to be at once uſeful to the Nation, and at the ſame Time, not dangerous to the Conſtitution; by adding too much

Power, to one or other of the conſtituent Parts, is a Point, which ought to be deeply and maturely conſidered. But let us, in the End, come to what Reſolution we pleaſe, upon that Subject; a Militia could anſwer none of thoſe Ends, for which we entered into the Subſidiary Treaties. To digeſt a proper Scheme for a Militia, would take up much Time; to put this Scheme in Execution, would require more; and nothing, but a long and aſſiduous Practice, could make it uſeful and effective. In the mean Time an Invaſion might take us unprepared; and as to the moſt neceſſary Purpoſes on the Continent, a Militia is no Aſſiſtance at all. It is an ill Policy to confide all upon one Caſt. A Militia might repulſe an Invader; it may be defeated too; and what terrible Conſequences might ſuch a De-Defeat draw after it within the Kingdom? It is true, that the Circumſtance of fighting in ones own Country, in the Preſence of their Families, and Friends, *pro aris & focis*, has often given great Spirit to an Army; but on the other Hand, it is no way improbable, that the Conſideration of the ruinous Conſequence attending a Loſs may diſhearten them; and it has often done ſo in ſimilar Caſes. The *Romans* always fared worſt in *Italy*. *Africa* was the weak Part of the *Carthaginians*. And it was the Opinion of *Ageſilaus*, that the King of *Perſia* could not be hurt but in his own Territories.

I do

I do not think, that our own People have generally made a Defence worthy of their great military Character, when they have been attacked by a foreign Enemy in *England*.

As I believe it is pretty clear, that to do ourſelves Right, indeed to protect ourſelves, we muſt have Connections upon the Continent; and that the Way of Subſidies is the cheapeſt and beſt Method of keeping up that Connection, and making it effectual for our Purpoſes. I believe it may be ſhewn, with equal Clearneſs, that thoſe Courts, with whom we have engaged, can do us the moſt Service in preventing thoſe Evils, for the averting of which we entered into the Engagements, in Queſtion.

And, firſt, ſhould *France* attempt to diſturb the Tranquility of the Empire, and moleſt his Majeſty's Electoral Dominions, for his Heroic Regard to his Regal ones; can there be any Prince better ſituated to afford a ſpeedy Succour, than the Landgrave of *Heſſe Caſſell*, whoſe Territories border upon thoſe of his Majeſty? The Succours from thence might be almoſt inſtantaneous; and are far from contemptible, when joined with the Forces his Majeſty has already on Foot in that Quarter; and thoſe which a People, juſtly ſenſible of the Bleſſings which they enjoy under the beſt of Princes, muſt compoſe, when all that is deareſt to them in the World is at Stake; theſe ſurely may keep the Enemy at Bay at

leaſt, until a more conſiderable Succour could arrive.

As to *Ruſſia*, I think, the Advantages derived from that Alliance, as they are greater, ſo I think them more eaſily diſcerned too. For could we ſuppoſe, that there is any Prince in the Empire of boundleſs Ambition, and who might in part ſatisfy that Ambition in a general Confuſion; I do not know any Power ſo capable, by its Strength and Situation, of being a Check upon him. It is ſaid, indeed, that all the Miſchief may be done before the Troops ſtipulated can poſſibly arrive. I allow it poſſible, that much Miſchief may be done, as in War how can it be avoided? But what is propoſed, is not to prevent all Sorts of Evils, which would be an idle Undertaking; but to pevent the Deſigns of the Enemy from taking a laſting Effect: We cannot prevent all the Calamities incident to War; what we ought to aim at is, to guard againſt the laſt and worſt. It is an idle Buſineſs, to ſcheme at a Diſtance, the Operations of poſſible Campaigns; but will any ſay, that a Force ſufficient to make ſome Stand, in the Electoral Dominions, may not be had together, until the *Ruſſian* Auxiliaries were tranſported by Sea (could no better Means of Paſſage be had) to his Majeſty's Port of *Harbourg*? And might not this be done in part, at leaſt, as ſoon as ever there was a probable Appearance of a Deſign to diſturb the Tranquility

quilty of the Empire? Muſt not the *French* Army take a Time to march? And if they take Time, in the Execution of their Deſigns, is not that Time open for us to oppoſe them? On the whole, we have not the leaſt Reaſon to apprehend, that theſe Treaties will not anſwer their Purpoſes very ſufficiently, ſhould Things come to extremeties, *but perhaps they may do more, and prevent the Neceſſity of ever being brought into Act.* I am ſure, they have already cauſed one of the moſt extraordinary Phænomena, that ever appeared in the political Syſtem; and ſeem to have confounded thoſe Heads, whoſe Cabals had been the Cauſe of all the Confuſion in *Europe.*

The Fact ſpeaks itſelf; I ſhall therefore ſay no more upon it; but only intreat my Countrymen, every one to uſe his own Reaſon, to judge for himſelf, and to conſider, "This is a Time of Publick Danger;" and that one Conſideration will, I think, at once diſcover to every reaſonable Man the *Propriety* of their Reaſonings, who, at ſuch a Time, do all they can to infuſe Doubts, and raiſe Diſcontents among the People.

So long a Diſcuſſion indeed was not neceſſary to thoſe who *ſpread* Opinions, prejudicial to the Publick Peace; though perhaps it may not be uſeleſs to them, who are infected by them. The Fears of *thoſe Perſons*, are, in Reality, leſt our Auxiliaries ſhould juſtify the Steps which have been taken, by being a

real

real Advantage to us. They forebode Ill from their Malice, and their Pride makes them fear to be diſappointed. They are a Sort of Men, which grow up in all Commonwealths (of which they are the Peſt) Men of an overweening Opinion of their own Talents, and an inſatiable Ambition; who can think well of no Counſels, but their own; and care not what becomes of their Country, when it does not ſubmit to be guided by their Direction. Theſe are a People, who when the publick Counſels are unſucceſsful, take an Opportunity to triumph over the Nation's Weakneſs, and to extol their own Sagacity. And if the Nation ſhould triumph, they have ever the Sagacity to diſcern ſome latent Miſchief, even in our Succeſſes. Our preſent Joy is to be productive of a future Sorrow; ſomthing muſt be amiſs. Either the Advantage was not purſued ſufficiently; or it was carried too far. Phyſicians, they are, ever reading Lectures on the Diſeaſe, but who ſpeak nothing of the Remedy; Builders, whoſe Skill conſiſts in demoliſhing; but who know nothing of that noble Architecture, which transforms a little Town, into a great City. Perpetual *Diſputants*, who never can ſettle or decide. So habituated to ſearching out Faults, that they have loſt all Reliſh for Perfection. So long enured to Poiſon, that it becomes their natural Food.

Should

Should a Reptile of this Species, whom Fear, Deſpair, and Greedineſs had long buried in his Hole, where he lay wound up in himſelf, feeding on Rancour and Diſcontent; ſhould ſuch a Reptile, in the active Seaſon, caſt off his Slough, and ſpring out in the Face of Day, you will know him by theſe Marks. His Characteriſticks are a *Rattle* and a *Sting*; his only Language is an *Hiſs*; ſlippery and gloſſy, and *Glittering*, nimble and *ready at a Turn*; but without Feature, or Limbs, or Proportion. Should this Monſter attempt to ſcatter his Poiſon among the Herd

——*Cape Saxa manu, Cape robora, paſtor,*
Tollentemque Minas, et Sibila Colla tumentem
Dejice——

F I N I S.

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